One Simple Test of Samuelson\u27s Dictum for the Stock Market by Jung, Jeeman & Shiller, Robert J.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
10-1-2002 
One Simple Test of Samuelson's Dictum for the Stock Market 
Jeeman Jung 
Robert J. Shiller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jung, Jeeman and Shiller, Robert J., "One Simple Test of Samuelson's Dictum for the Stock Market" 
(2002). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 1651. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1651 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
ONE SIMPLE TEST OF SAMUELSON’S DICTUM FOR THE STOCK MARKET
By
Jeeman Jung and Robert J. Shiller
October 2002
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1386
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
ONE SIMPLE TEST OF SAMUELSON’S DICTUM






Samuelson (1998) offered the dictum that the stock market is “micro
efficient” but “macro inefficient.”  That is, the efficient markets
hypothesis works much better for individual stocks than it does for the
aggregate stock market. In this paper, we present one simple test, based
both on regressions and on a simple scatter diagram that vividly
illustrates that there is some truth to Samuelson’s dictum.  The data
comprise all U.S. firms on the CRSP tape that have survived since 1926.
Keywords: Market efficiency, Random walk, Dividend yield, Dividend
price ratio, Present value, Excess volatility, Gordon model
JEL Classification: G14
The authors are indebted to John Y. Campbell, Paul A. Samuelson, and
Tuomo Vuolteenaho for comments.  Ana Fostel provided research
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1
Paul A. Samuelson has argued that one would expect that the
efficient markets hypothesis should work better for individual stocks
than for the stock market as a whole:
Modern markets show considerable micro efficiency (for the reason
that the minority who spot aberrations from micro efficiency can make
money from those occurrences and, in doing so, they tend to wipe out
any persistent inefficiencies).  In no contradiction to the previous
sentence, I had hypothesized considerable macro inefficiency, in the
sense of long waves in the time series of aggregate indexes of security
prices below and above various definitions of fundamental values.1
We will put this dictum the test in terms of the simplest efficient markets
model that asserts that stock prices equal the expected present value
(with constant discount rates) of expected future dividends.  We will
examine Samuelson’s dictum by the simple method of running a regres-
sion of future multi-year dividend changes on current dividend-price
ratios and testing whether the dividend–price ratio predicts these
changes, along lines shown in Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001), but for
individual stocks 1926–2001, as well as for stock indexes. This will
allow us to see in very direct terms whether the simple efficient markets
model works better for individual stocks than it does for indexes.  It will
allow us some new insights into the claim of LeRoy and Porter (1981)
and Shiller (1981) that stocks are excessively volatile to be justified in
terms of information about future dividends, and the conclusion of
Campbell (1991) that variance of news about future cash flows accounts
for only a third to a half of the variance of unexpected stock returns.
                                                          
1. This quote is from a private letter from Paul Samuelson to John Campbell and
Robert Shiller.  The quote appears, and is discussed, in Robert J. Shiller,
Irrational Exuberance, 2nd Edition, 2001, p. 243.  Samuelson’s dictum is also
treated in Samuelson (1998).
2
Our use of individual stock data over a 75-year interval also allows
us another advantage over tests of market efficiency based on stock-price
indexes.  When we assume that stock prices are, according to efficient
markets theory, optimal forecasts of the present value of dividends
discounted by an estimated constant rate, it follows that the present value
gives weight to future dividends many years in the future.  Since few
firms survive as separate firms for as long a time as the present value
formula gives substantial weight to, the efficient markets model has
usually been tested using stock price indexes, which continue without
interruptions through time.  But with stock price indexes, the changing
composition of the index over the years means that the subsequent
dividends reported for the index at time t + k are not the dividends
accruing on the stocks comprising the index at time t.  While one may
argue that this changing composition of the index is not a problem for
index-based tests of market efficiency, it does introduce a layer of
complexity to the analysis.  In this paper, we take the simpler approach
of just looking at how well individual stock prices relative to dividends
predict the stock’s actual own dividend changes far into the future.
The Efficient Markets Model in Dynamic Gordon Model Form
One way of writing the simple efficient markets model expresses the
dividend-price ratio as a function of expected future dividend growth.
Assuming a constant discount rate but varying growth rate of real
dividends, the dividend-price ratio D Pt t/  can be derived from the simple
expected present value relation with discount rate r as;
3
(1)
Pt is the real (inflation corrected) stock price at the end of year t, Dt  is
the real dividend during the year t, ∆D D Dt t t= − −1 , r is the discount
factor used in the present value formula for stock prices, and Et denotes
expectation conditional on information at time t.2
Note that in the equation gt
D , representing a dividend growth rate, is
expressed as the sum of discounted amounts of future dividend changes
from a $1 investment at time t.3  In other words, the growth rates are
computed relative to price P rather than D, and this is important since
with individual firms there are in fact some zero dividends, and so
growth rates of dividends themselves could not be calculated.
The equation can be viewed as a dynamic counterpart of the Gordon
model, D/P = r – g, where g is the constant expected dividend growth
rate.  The equation (1) implies that at times when the dividend–price
ratio is high, it portends relatively low growth of dividends over future
years, while when the dividend-price ratio is low, it portends relatively
rapid growth of dividends over future years.  We take this model as
                                                          
2. Note that efficient markets theory implies (1) even if firms repurchase shares
in lieu of paying as much dividends: the share repurchase has the effect of
raising subsequent per-share dividends.
3. Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b) used a log-approximation of the
dividend-price model as follows;
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4
representing the essence of the simple efficient markets model. While
there are other versions of the efficient markets model, with additional
complexities, this simple version has sufficient currency in public
thinking, at least as a first approximation, to warrant learning whether it
is at least approximately true.
We could in theory evaluate this model, after turning the efficient
markets equation around to E g r D Pt t
D
t t= − / , by regressing, with time
series data, gt
D  onto a constant and the dividend price ratio D Pt t/ , and
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of D Pt t/  is minus one.
Such a test of the efficient markets hypothesis would be recommended
by its simplicity and immediacy.  There is however the practical
difficulty that the summation extends to infinity and so the right hand
side can never be computed with finite data.  Campbell and Shiller
(1988b) showed a rigorous way of testing a loglinearized version of this
model under the assumption of a vector auto-regressive model for the
change in log dividends and the log dividend-price ratio.4  A simpler, and
more direct way, without adding the additional assumptions implicit in
the vector-autoregressive model, is to approximate the right hand side
and run a regression of the approximated right hand side onto the
dividend price ratio.  This was done in Campbell and Shiller (1998),
(2001) for aggregate stock market indexes.  Campbell and Shiller (2001)
regressed ten-year log dividend growth rates ln( / )D Dt t+10  onto
                                                          
4. Campbell and Shiller rejected the efficient markets model using index data,
while Vuolteenaho (2002) found more encouraging results for efficient markets
theory when he applied the vector-autoregressive methods to individual firm
data of 1954–96.
5
ln( / )D Pt t  with annual Standard & Poor Composite stock price data
using the long time-series data of 1871 to 2000. The coefficient of
ln( / )D Pt t  turned out to be positive, to have the wrong sign.  The result
was interpreted as indicating that in the entire history of the U.S. stock
market, the dividend-price ratio has never predicted dividend growth in
accordance with the simple efficient markets theory.  More complex
versions of the efficient markets model, involving time-varying interest
rates, were also explored using a generalization of this model, and also
found wanting, Campbell and Shiller (1988a).  In this paper, which con-
centrates on individual firm differences, we focus on the simpler version
of the model, with constant discount rates, since this version represents
the most popular version of efficient markets theory, asserting just that
movements in the price of any stock relative to its dividend reflect new
information about the outlook for the future payoff of that stock.
Running the Regression with Individual Stock Data
A fundamental problem with testing this model with individual stock
data is, as we have noted, that while the model concerns growth rates of
dividends from decade to decade, there are not many firms that survive
for many decades.  In fact, when we did a search on the Center for
Research on Security Prices (CRSP) tape, we found that there were only
49 firms that appear on the tape continuously without missing
information during the period of 1926 to 2001.5   Since the number of
                                                          
5. When Poterba and Summers (1988) did a similar search of the CRSP tape,
they found 82 survival firms during the 1926–1985 period. The smaller number
here apparently reflects the continuing disappearance of firms through time.
While the number of firms is small, we observe that they span a wide variety of
6
surviving firms is so small, there is a risk that they are atypical, not
representative of all firms.  While this risk must be borne in mind in
evaluating our results, we believe that looking at this the universe of
surviving U.S. firms on the CRSP tape still offers some substantial
insights, at least as a case study.  Note that the mere fact of survival
would be expected if anything to put an upward bias on the average
return on the stocks.  It would have no obvious implication for either the
time-series or cross-sectional ability of the dividend–price ratio to predict
future changes in dividends.
Using monthly data from the CRSP tape, we create the series of
annual dividends, Dt , by summing up twelve monthly dividends from
January to December of the year; the price Pt  is for the end of the year.
6   
We exclude from the series non-ordinary dividends due to liquidation,
acquisition, reorganization, rights offering, and stock splits.  All the
dividends and stock prices are adjusted by the proper price adjustment
factors obtained from the CRSP tape and then are expressed in real terms
using the Consumer Price index. As a proxy for the future dividend
growth gt
D we use gt
D
, the summation truncated after K years:
                                                                                                                                 
industries.  Among the 49 firms, there are 31 manufacturing firms, 5 utility
companies, 5 wholesale & retails, 3 financial firms, 4 mines & oil companies
and one telecommunication company.
6. The results are invariant to the starting month for the calculation of annual
dividends.  We also work on the same estimation using the data of survival firms
after World War II.  There are 125 firms that have existed during the 1946–2001
period without any missing information on stock prices and dividends.  The




and we set r equal to 0.064, which is the annual average return over all
firms and dates in the sample.7
To confirm statistical significance, we regress Dtĝ  onto a constant
and Dt /Pt with the 49 individual firms data in three different ways:
(A) separately for each of the 49 firms (49 regressions each with 76-K
observations ), (B) pooled over all firms with a dummy for each firm
(one stacked regression with 49 × (76-K) observations) and (C) for the
equally-weighted portfolio composed of the 49 firms (one regression
with 76-K observations).  Table 1 shows the three results for K = 10, 15,
20, and 25, while for the pooled regression, K = 75 is also shown. When
appropriate, t-statistics were computed using a Hansen–Hodrick (1980)
procedure to correct these statistics for the effects of serial correlation in
the error term due to the overlapping 10-, 15-, 20- or 25-year intervals
with annual data. For the stacked regressions (B) for K = 10, 15, 20 and
25, the Hansen–Hodrick procedure was modified to take account as well
of contemporaneous correlation of errors across firms.8
If there were no problem of survivorship bias and if the truncation of
                                                          
7. We avoid the common practice of using the terminal price, Pt+K to infer
dividend changes beyond t + K since that would bring us back to using a sort of
return variable as the dependent variable in our regressions: we want our method
to have a simple interpretation, here just whether the dividend-price ratio
predicts future dividend growth.
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8
our infinite sum for Dtĝ  were not a problem, then we would expect that
the slope in the regressions should be minus one and the intercept be the
average return on the market.  In fact, the truncation of the infinite sum
means that the coefficient might be something other than minus one.
Hence, we merely test here for the negativity of the coefficient of the
dividend–price ratio, looking only to see if it is significant in predicting
future dividend changes in the right direction.  Because of survivorship
bias, the fact that we are looking only at surviving firms would appear to
put a possible upward bias on the intercept, and hence we do not focus
on the intercept here.
Table 1 Panel A reports the summary result of the 49 individual
regressions.  For K = 10, the average coefficient and the average t-
statistic on D Pt t/  are –0.440 and –2.11, respectively. We find that for K
= 10, 42 out of the 49 firms had negative coefficients as predicted by the
theory, and 20 of them are statistically significant at 5% significance
level.9  As K is increased, the average t-statistic and R squared decrease.
The coefficient of D/P always has the negative coefficient predicted by
the Gordon model, though far from –1.00.  Thus, D/P does seem to
forecast future dividend growth, although the coefficient is shrunken
from minus one towards zero, as one might expect if there is some
extraneous noise D/P (caused, say, by investor fads), causing an errors-
in-variables bias in the coefficient.
Table 1 Panel B shows the results when the regressions were pooled,
so that there are (except where K = 75) many more observations in the
                                                          
9. Those results, not reported in the table to conserve the space, are available
from the authors on request.
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regression than in Panel A and hence more power to the test. In the K =
75 case, the limiting case with our 76 annual observations, the regression
reduces to a simple cross section regression of the 49 firms for t = 1926.
Since there are only 49 observations in the K = 75 case, the test is not
powerful here, and we report it only for completeness.  For K = 10, 15,
20, and 25 the t-statistic is highly significant and negative.  As K is
increased, the coefficient of the dividend-price ratio decreases, and at K
= 75, the coefficient is very close to its theoretical value of –1.00 (though
poorly measured since only 1926 D/P are used).  These results provide
impressive evidence for the Gordon model as applied to individual firm
data in the sense that the estimated coefficients are significantly negative,
though usually above minus one.
Table 1 Panel C shows the results when the regressions were put
together into one regression (by using an equally-weighted portfolio) so
that we can test the Gordon model as applied to an index of the 49 stock
prices.  The coefficient of the dividend-price ratio has a positive sign, the
wrong sign from the standpoint of the Gordon model, and no longer is
statistically significant except for K = 25.  The wrong sign mirrors the
negative result for the efficient markets model that Campbell and Shiller
(1988a) found with a much broader stock market index.
The t-statistics reported for Panel C are for the null hypothesis that
the coefficient of D/P is zero; the statistics are much larger against the
efficient markets hypothesis that the coefficient equals minus one.
However, there is an issue that the distribution of our t-statistics may not
approximate the normal distribution if D/P is nonstationary, or nearly so.
While our financial theory suggests that the dividend yield should be
10
stationary, in fact the dividend yield is at best slowly mean-reverting.
Elliott and Stock (1994) show that the size distortion in the t-statistic
caused by near-unit root behavior may be substantial.  Campbell and
Yogo (2002) show however that if we rule out explosive processes for
the dividend-price ratio in regressions like those of panel C, there is good
evidence against market efficiency.
We interpret these results as confirming the Samuelson Dictum. In
our results there is substantial evidence that individual firm dividend-
price ratios predict future dividend growth in the right direction, but no
evidence that aggregate dividend-price ratios do.
A Look at the Data
Figure 1 shows a scatter diagram of gt
D
for K = 25 against D Pt t/  for
all 2,499 observations, that is for all 49 firms and for t = 1926 to 1976
(1976 being the last year for which 25 subsequent years are available).
The range of D Pt t/  is from 0.000 to 0.400 — several times as wide as
the range (from 0.022 to 0.099) of the dividend-price ratio for the aggre-
gate stock market over the sample period.  Over this entire range, there is
a distinct negative slope to the curve, as the efficient markets theory
would predict: firms with lower dividend–price ratios did indeed have
higher subsequent dividend growth, offering some evidence for micro
efficiency.  Plots for K = 10, 15, and 20 look very similar to Figure 1.
One should be cautious in interpreting this diagram, however.  Note
that by construction all points lie on or above a line from (0,0) with a
slope of minus one, reflecting the simple fact that dividends cannot go
below zero.  The efficient markets model and our assumption that
11
dividends beyond K years into the future cannot be forecasted instead
says that the scatter should cluster around a line from (0,r–c) with a slope
of minus one, a line that lies above the other line and is parallel with it,
where c is the mean of the truncated portion of the present value formula,
as well as any possible survivorship bias.  But our results are not
guaranteed by construction.  Indeed when the scatter of points for the
aggregated firms (corresponding to the third regressions, Panel C in the
table) is plotted, it lies above this line but does not have a negative slope.
This line from (0,0) with a slope of minus one is easily spotted
visually as the lower envelope of the scatter of points. Any observation
of D Pt t/  that is followed by a dramatic drop in dividends (to approxi-
mately zero for K years) will lie approximately on this line.  Some of the
most visible points on the scatter represent such firms. For example, the
extreme right outlier on the scatter, representing Schlumberger Ltd. in
1931, represents nothing more than a situation in which the firm
attempted to maintain its dividend level in spite of rapidly declining
fortunes. Its stock price fell precipitously after the 1929 crash, converting
a roughly 8% dividend into a 40% dividend, which was cut to zero in
1932, and held there for many years.  This extreme case may be regarded
as a victory for the efficient markets model, in that it does show that the
dividend–price ratio predicts future dividend growth, though not the
usual case we think of when we consider market efficiency. It is plain
from the fact that the points are so dense around the lower envelope line,
that much of the fit derives from firms whose dividends dropped sharply.
Another simple story is that of firms that pay zero dividends. Note
that all firm-year pairs with zero dividends can be seen arrayed next to
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the vertical axis, and that the dividend growth for these firms tends to be
higher than for the firms with non-zero dividends, as the dynamic
Gordon model would predict. Firms with zero dividends showed higher
dividend growth as measured by gt
D
:  the mean gt
D
 for the zero-
dividend observations is 0.149, which, is greater than r = 0.064, possibly
reflecting the selection bias for surviving firms noted above.  The fact
that these points along the vertical axis cluster above 0.064 might also be
considered a sort of approximate victory for market efficiency.  Also
note that even if we deleted these firms, there still is a pronounced
negative slope to the scatter.  The predictive ability of the dynamic
Gordon model is not just due to the phenomenon of zero dividends.
Even if we delete all observations of zero dividends, and look at
dividend price ratios less than the discount rate r, that is, less than 0.064,
then the slope of the regression line for K = 25 changes to –0.479, not
much closer to zero. This means that there are also observations of a low
but non-zero dividend–price ratio successfully predicting above-normal
dividend growth.
Regression diagnostics following Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980)
revealed that no particularly influential observations were responsible for
the results in the pooled regressions.
Summary
With these data on the universe of U.S. individual firms on the CRSP
tape with continuous data since 1926 Samuelson’s dictum appears to
have some validity.  Over the interval of U.S. history since 1926,
individual-firm dividend–price ratios have had some significant
13
predictive power for subsequent growth rates in real dividends: this is
evidence of micro-efficiency.  A look at a scatter plot of the data
confirms that this result is not exclusively due to zero dividends.
Moreover, when the 49 firms are aggregated into an index, the dividend–
price ratio gets the wrong sign in the regressions, and is usually
insignificant.  If anything, high aggregate dividend-price ratios predict
high aggregate dividend growth, and so there is no evidence of macro
efficiency.10
                                                          
10. The results are consistent with those of Vuolteenaho (2002), who uses firm-
level data in conjunction with a vector autoregressive model and a variance
decomposition along lines first described in Campbell (1991) to conclude that
firm level stock returns are predominantly driven by fundamentals. Cohen, Polk
and Vuolteenaho (2002) provide a similar variance decomposition of firm-level
price to book ratios, finding that fundamentals predominate.  Jung (2002) finds
using variance and covariance ratio tests that individual stock returns show quite
different mean reversion characteristics from the portfolio of them.
14















Figure 1.  Scatter diagram showing dividend price ratio D Pt t/ , hori-
zontal axis, and subsequent 25-year dividend growth ( )gt
D
 (equation 2,
K = 25), vertical axis, 2,499 observations shown, comprising 49 firms, t
= 1926 through 1976.
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Table 1
Results of Regressions of Future Dividend Growth
on Current Dividend-Price Ratio:  g D Pt
D
t t t= + +α β ε( / )
Coefficient
of D Pt t/ T statistic R squared
A. Average of 49 Separate Regressions
         i)  K = 10, n = 66 each regression
        ii)  K = 15, n = 61 each regression
       iii)  K = 20, n = 56 each regression













B. Pooled over all firms
         i)  K = 10, n = 3,234
        ii)  K = 15, n = 2,989
       iii)  K = 20, n = 2,744
iv)  K = 25, n = 2,499
















C. Using the portfolio of the 49 firms
         i)  K = 10, n = 66
        ii)  K = 15, n = 61
       iii)  K = 20, n = 56
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